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CASE COMMENT
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v.
Zenith Radio Corp.: The Death Knell for
Predatory Price Fixing and the Avoidance




The case of Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., recently decided by the United States Supreme Court, represents
a significant step in antitrust law and a significant sidestep as to the in-
ternational implications of U.S. antitrust law. On the one hand, the Court
adopted a firm stance on policy towards predatory pricing, while on the
other, a decision on the weight to be given to a foreign sovereign's control
of defendant's actions was completely avoided. The two major issues
before the court involved a charge by American manufacturers that their
Japanese counterparts conspired to drive them out of the market through
a predatory price fixing scheme.
Generally, predatory pricing occurs when a company in a strong fi-
nancial position lowers its prices to drive out the competition even if it
sustains substantial losses. The reward is a market virtually devoid of
competition allowing unrestricted increases in the company's prices. The
Japanese manufacturers, in part, defended their concerted actions as an
involuntary compliance with their government's demands. The foreign
sovereign compulsion defense essentially immunizes defendants from U.S.
antitrust liability when their anti-competitive behavior is the result of a
foreign government's exercise of sovereign power. Since an enterprise
must comply with the domestic laws of its place of business, it would be
unfair to punish that enterprise merely because it complied with its own
government's demands.
The Supreme Court rendered an opinion that completely ignored the
evidentiary issues that subsumed the lower courts' decisions. This is not
to say, however, that the Court's decision is without merit. The opinion is
* J.D. 1986, University of Denver; B.A., B.S., 1981, University of Colorado.
1. 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
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decisive on several matters in predatory pricing which were left specula-
tive by prior case law. This comment shall endeavor to make a concise
historical presentation of the case and will be followed by an analysis of
the two issues mentioned above.
II. THE FACTS
In 1970, National Union Electric Corporation (NUE)5 filed a suit
against several Japanese manufacturers of consumer electrical products
(CEP).' NUE alleged that the Japanese manufacturers of CEPs had con-
spired to reduce their prices in order to drive American competitors out
of the U.S. market. This case was consolidated with an action filed by
Zenith Radio Corporation." Except for the fact that more defendants
were named, the allegations by Zenith were similar.5 The specific offenses
complained of were: (1) a conspiracy to violate sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act; (2) attempted and actual monopolization in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act; (3) the violation of the Robinson Patman
Act for discriminatory pricing among American purchasers;7 (4) violations
of section 7 of the Clayton Act 8 were alleged against defendants Sears,
Motorola, Matsushita and Sanyo; and (5) the violation of the 1916 An-
tidumping Act 9 for the systematic sale of CEPs below the Japanese mar-
ket price.'0 The evidence presented by Zenith approached mammoth pro-
portions and consequently District Judge Becker, through a pre-trial
order, required the plaintiffs to submit all of their evidence before trial in
a final pre-trial statement (FPS) with preclusive effect." The court's final
decision dismissing the case occurred during the pre-trial stage and an
evaluation of the antitrust legal issues never came to fruition.
In order to grasp the factual context of the allegations against the
2. NUE is the successor to Emerson Radio Company, one of the pioneers of the radio
and television industry. NUE terminated the production of television receivers in February
1970.
3. National Union Electric Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., No. 1706-70
(D.N.J. filed Dec. 21, 1970).
4. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Co., No. 74-2451 (E.D.Pa. filed Sept. 20,
1974). From this point on only Zenith will be named when referring to the plaintiffs.
5. The ten principal defendants were Mitsubishi Corporation, Matsushita Electric In-
dustrial Co., Ltd., Toshiba Corp., Hitachi Ltd., Sharp Corp., Mitsubishi Electric Corp.
(MELCO), Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd., Sony Corp., Motorola, Inc. and Sears, Roebuck & Co.
The other companies are subsidiaries of the principal Japanese defendants. Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190, 1194 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970 & Supp. 1986).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) dismissed for failure to state a claim. Zenith, 402 F. Supp. 244
(E.D. Pa. 1975).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
9. Revenue Act of 1916, § 801, 15 U.S.C § 72 (1970).
10. The case was dismissed on summary judgment and on appeal was affirmed only as
to three defendants. Zenith 494 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D.Pa. 1980) rev'd 723 F.2d 319 (3d Cir.
1983).
11. Zenith, 478 F. Supp. 889, 946 (E.D.Pa. 1979).
VOL. 15:2,3
MATSUSHITA V. ZENITH
Japanese manufacturers, it is best to summarize the alleged facts from
Zenith's point of view, as they urged the Supreme Court to consider. Ac-
cording to Zenith, the conspiracy began in the late 1950s and expanded
from radios to black and white television receivers and finally to color
television receivers as those products were introduced into the market-
place. The fullest strength of the conspiracy was realized when the Japa-
nese manufacturers sought and obtained permission to form a cartel from
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).' 2 After ob-
taining such permission in 1963 by "acting secretly and with mutual
knowledge and understanding" of their undisclosed common purposes,
"petitioners (Japanese manufacturers) jointly and systematically trans-
formed the character of the cartel.'
3
The cartel agreements and rules mandated minimum "check prices"
on receivers imported into the United States.' Violations of the "check
prices" were considered a violation of Japanese law.' 5 Even though the
"check prices" were found to be below U.S. market prices, Zenith did not
rest on this point in their conspiracy charge. Rather, Zenith alleged that
the manufacturers were involved in a scheme to sell to U.S. distributors
at prices much lower than the "check prices" while hiding the matter
from both the U.S. Customs Service and the Japanese authorities.'
In order to avert suspicion from the governmental authorities, the
manufacturers had to report their transactions at the "check prices" des-
ignated by the cartel.' Form 5515 used by importers in reporting to the
U.S. Customs Service indicates that the "check prices" were actually re-
ported. The scheme was effectuated through a refunding process to the
distributors. Zenith stressed the fact that the scheme could not work un-
less all of the manufacturers and all of the U.S. importers cooperated in
the conspiracy. 8 The difference between the "voluntary camouflaged
12. Respondent's Brief at 14, Matsushita, 106 S.Ct. 1348. The Japanese Export and
Import Trading Act authorizes the MITI to exempt companies from the antitrust laws in
order to form a cartel. The proposed cartel would be granted only if:
(a) there is no fear of violating treaties and other arrangements concluded with
foreign governments or the international agencies; (b) the interests of import-
ers or enterprises concerned at the destination is not injured and there is no
fear of gravely injuring international confidence in Japanese exporters: and (c)
participation in or the withdrawal from the agreement is not unjustly
restricted.
13. Id.
14. The formal agreement called the "rationales" stated that the reason for the cartel
was to prevent Japanese CEP imports from "disrupting the United States market and injur-
ing United States manufacturers."Id.
15. This allegation became the central argument as to the foreign sovereign compulsion
issue avoided by the Supreme Court. See Petitioner's Brief at 36 and Respondent's Brief at
88. Matsushita 106 S. Ct. 1348.
16. Respondent's Brief at 15, Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. 1348.
17. Id. at 15-16.
18. The different prices reported to the United States Customs Service would have
alerted the officials. Id. at 31.
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price" and the "contract price" was termed the "check price balance" or
the "difference money." The distributors would keep an accounting of the
"difference money," and the Japanese manufacturers would refund the
money principally through:
(a) checks that petitioners secretly drew on their Hong Kong, Japa-
nese and Swiss bank accounts and hand-delivered or mailed to the
United States; (b) secret telegraphic fund transfers to the United
States through petitioner's foreign bank accounts in Switzerland, Ger-
many and other countries; (c) "credits" disguised as offset credits on
tooling costs the buyer would ordinarily have paid, or credits for free
spare parts or credits toward the purchase price of other products not
subject to current dumping examination, including the "over-under"
or "over-and-under" billing technique;'0 (d) "usuance" or "usuance in-
terest"; 0 (e) deposits in the United States customers' yen bank ac-
counts in Japan; (f) travelers checks which petitioner's employees
while visiting the United States would hand-deliver to United States
buyers.2
Both sides of the lawsuit accounted for the transfers which were based
upon the same fictitious nomenclature. 2 While the cartel agreement was
not renewed in 1973, Zenith points to evidence that showed the continued
use of rebating among suppliers until 1977.23
In order to sustain their enterprises in view of continued losses in-
curred by the rebate scheme, the Japanese manufacturers optimized their
control of the closed Japanese domestic market. 4 By compiling a "war
19. "[Tlhe difference between the higher 'invoice' price and the 'actual' price is
credited toward and deducted from the actual agreed purchase price of another product
which the same buyer desired to purchase, thus reducing the agreed price on other products
to lower levels (and requiring further false declarations for those products and customs
fraud on shipments of such other products, as well as on TV products)." Id. at 36.
20. "[Pletitioners allowed extended payment terms, permitted the buyer to retain accu-
mulated interest on the letter of credit, and credited this sum against the 'difference money'
owed the buyer." Id. at 37.
21. Id. at 36-7 (citations and footnotes omitted).
22. The payments were placed in the books under commissions, loyalty discounts, ex-
cessive inspections and compensation for market research. Id. at 37.
23. By this time the scheme had unraveled, when two of the importers acknowledged
the practice to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States Customs
Service. Another importer was indicted and pleaded guilty to customs fraud. Id. at 52.
24. As explained by Zenith,
[the] petitioners eliminated competition among themselves by agreeing to sta-
bilize and maintain high prices. These activities enhanced petitioner's conspir-
atorial control over their U.S.-Japan dumping margin, i.e. the difference be-
tween their Japanese market prices and their much lower U.S. prices. These
concerted activities furthered the objects of the conspiracy by (a) giving them
joint control over their prices in the closed Japanese market, (b) aggravating
the dumping margin on sales in the U.S., (c) stabilizing the Japanese price
component of the margin at artificially high prices, and (d) enhancing peti-
tioner's ability to achieve the common objectives by improving return on sales
in the Japanese market, and permitting them to deepen the dumping margin
on the U.S. side and continue the conspiracy over a longer period of time.
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chest" through domestic sales, the Japanese manufacturers subsidized
sales at a loss to the United States.
The theory finally presented by Zenith to the trial court" was as fol-
lows. There existed a single (unitary) conspiracy with two facets, the do-
mestic market and the export market. The aim of the conspiracy was to
take over the U.S. CEP market at the expense of the U.S. CEP industry.
The domestic market, closed to foreign firms through a combination of
government control and economic tradition, provided the resources to
subsidize the export facet by charging high prices to the Japanese con-
sumer. The export market was attacked at two levels. First, low "check
prices" were set by the cartel and second, the "check prices" were under-
cut with the cooperation of the American importers which compounded
the destruction. In addition, for the duration of the conspiracy, the Japa-
nese manufacturers never competed with each other. The ultimate goal
and reward of the predatory pricing conspiracy was to create an entire
market open for unchallenged high prices."8 This theory was supported by
numerous documents witnessing meetings, memoranda and diaries, all of
which were carefully scrutinized by the district court.
III. THE CASE HISTORY
A. The District Court
The basic task before the district court was to determine the admissi-
bility of the evidence compiled by Zenith within their final pre-trial state-
ment (FPS). The defendant manufacturers moved for summary judgment
based upon the FPS. The trial court considered the evidence in three
opinions,27 and in view of the scant evidence that was admissible, granted
the motion.2 8
An examination of all the evidence would have been an impossible
task. The pre-trial order designed to make the complex litigation manage-
able resulted in the submission of a 17,000 page FPS consisting of 250,000
documents, many of which were in Japanese.29 With the concurrence of
the plaintiffs, the court decided to rule on the admissibility of the docu-
ments essential to the plaintiffs' case. The documents fell into 13 catego-
ries, enumerated by the court as follows:
1. Documents, including certain findings, promulgated by the U.S.
Id. at 15.
25. Judge Becker showing some consternation as to the plaintiffs' conspiracy theory
stated: "One would expect, after ten years of litigation, that there would be no difficulty in
describing plaintiffs' conspiracy claims. Regrettably this is not true in this case, for plain-
tiffs' theory of defendants' alleged conspiracy has shifted on numerous occasions during the
recent course of this litigation. Zenith v. Matsushita, 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1124 (E.D.Pa.
1981).
26. Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1124-25.
27. Zenith (I), 505 F. Supp. 1125; Zenith (II), 505 F. Supp. 1190; Zenith (III), 505
F.Supp. 1313 (E.D.Pa. 1980).
28. Zenith, 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D.Pa. 1981).
29. Zenith (1), 505 F. Supp. at 1137.
1987
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Treasury Department and the U.S. Tariff Commission in connection with
proceedings under the 1921 Antidumping Act.
2. Documents, including certain findings, promulgated by the U.S.
Tariff Commission and its successor, the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission (ITC) as well as the Secretary of Labor under § 301(b)(1) and
(c)(1) and (2) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and §§ 201(b) and 221
of the Trade Act of 1974.
3. Certain purported findings and related documents of the Japanese
Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) arising out of proceedings in two cases
before the JFTC: one in 1957, brought against the Home Electric Market
Stabilization Council, some of whose members are defendants in this ac-
tion, alleging industry wide price fixing; and the second, brought in 1967,
alleging retail price maintenance against defendant Matsushita Electric
Industries Co., Ltd.
4. The findings of Judge Leon A. Higginbotham, Jr., a predecessor in
this case, regarding personal jurisdiction and venue.30
5. Statistical data from the statistical office of the United Nations
and a report of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD).
6. Diaries of officials of several of the Japanese defendants, alleged to
contain evidence of the conspiracy referenced in plaintiffs' complaint.
Also included in the category are a number of internal company memo-
randa seized by the JFTC.
3 1
7. Transcripts of testimony and of protocols by witnesses in the Six
Company Case.
8. Various agreements and rules of certain Japanese manufacturers'
associations relating to export practices.
9. Various documents alleged to be minutes or memoranda of meet-
ings of committees of certain manufacturers' associations.
10. A purported internal memorandum allegedly reflecting the deci-
sion made by the Electronic Industries Association of Japan (EIAJ) to
conceal from the Japanese MITI the discrepancy between domestic and
export prices and suggesting changes in accounting methods by which
such concealment could be accomplished.
11. Various memoranda, letters, telexes and transactional documents
produced by the defendants in discovery and involving the Japanese
manufacturers, their trading companies, their American sales subsidiaries
and various U.S. customers which, in plaintiffs' submission, show a pat-
tern of "under the table" or concealed rebates that reduced the price of
Japanese TV's to American customers below the so-called check prices
that were reported to U.S. customs, and which also reveal a "cover up" of
what plaintiffs describe as a predatory export scheme.
12. A potpourri of other documents, produced for the most part from
30. Zenith, 402 F.Supp. 262 (E.D.Pa. 1975).
31. The documents were seized as part of a JFTC case in 1966 known as the "Six Com-
pany Case."
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defendants' files during discovery.
13. Voluminous reports setting forth the opinions (with supporting
data) of plaintiffs' experts. 2
In the court's first evidentiary opinion, the first five categories were
considered together, since they fall under the public records and reports
exception to the hearsay rule.3 3 Only the documents printed by the U.N.
and the OECD were admissible, partly because the defendants did not
object strenuously to this point. 4
The district court's second opinion considered the evidence listed in
categories six through twelve. 35 Those documents basically related to the
manufacturers' activities in Japan. They were obtained mostly through
discovery and some were seized through a "raid" on the corporate head-
,quarters by the JFTC.3 8 Zenith claimed that a collective consideration of
that evidence would raise the inference that the manufacturers undertook
concerted action to deploy a predatory scheme.3 7 The trial court did not
consider this evidence as an essential segment of the plaintiffs' case, how-
ever. Its importance lay with the admissibility of the expert opinions.
Since the experts had relied on this evidence to form their opinion, a rul-
ing of inadmissibility based on untrustworthiness, would render the ex-
pert opinion of the same character.3 All of the diaries were ruled inad-
missible.3 9 The testimony of the employee-witnesses at the JFTC Six
Company Case was admissible as former testimony.40 The protocols were
32. Zenith (1), 505 F. Supp. at 1138-39.
33. FED. R. EvID. 803(8).
34. Categories (1), (2) and (3) were excluded because (a) they were not findings as re-
quired by Rule 803(8), (b) they were untrustworthy and (c) they should be excluded under
Rule 403 as unnecessarily cumulative anyway.
Category (4) was excluded because the statements by a judge could be given undue
weight by the jury and could also cause a confusion of the issues. Zenith (I), F. Supp. at
1150-84.
35. Zenith (II), 505 F. Supp. at 1190.
36. Id. at 1209.
37. Id. at 1211.
:38. Zenith (I), 505 F.Supp. at 1189.
39. Even though the plaintiffs never conducted a deposition in Japan in order to help
lay a foundation to authenticate the diaries, the court found enough circumstantial evidence
to meet the prima facie standard required by United States v. Goichmann, 547 F.2d 778 (3d
Cir 1976). Zenith (II), 505 F. Supp. at 1216. The evidence was presented for admission
under the hearsay exceptions of a business record, or as the admission of a party opponent.
FED. R. EVID. 803(6), 801(d)(2). In this case the diaries did not qualify as a record of regu-
larly conducted activity so as to be a business record. In order to be an admission, the
statement must be an assertion that was made in the scope of employment. Though there
exists a marginal validity as to the latter, no foundation was laid to show the statements
were assertions, thus the diaries did not qualify on the second ground either. Zenith (II),
505 F.Supp. at 1267-86.
40. The court agreed with the plaintiff that the cases had a similarity of issues and
purposes which would illicit a vigorous defense. The limitation, however, was that it applied
to only six of the defendants present in that case. References in the testimony to exports
were to be deleted since it was not the subject matter of the cases, as the proceedings were
based on charges of price fixing in Japan only. Id. at 1286-94.
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also admissible. The protocols were the statements of the defendants to
investigators, which were transcribed and signed by the defendants. 4' A
series of internal memoranda were excluded as not qualifying as business
records.42 The minutes and internal memoranda generated by the cartel
group, EIAJ, were also held to be inadmissible.
43
In the third and final evidentiary ruling, Judge Becker considered the
admissibility of the expert opinions contained in several prepared re-
ports.4 4 According to the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert can use
information that is inadmissible at trial as the basis of his opinion."5 That
information, however, must be "of a type reasonably relied upon by ex-
perts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject."4 Whether the information can be "reasonably relied" upon is to
be decided by the trial court.4 7 The court analyzed each report, section by
section, and concluded in each case, that the sections dealing with an al-
leged conspiracy were inadmissible.
4
1
The fourth opinion of the trial court was an in-depth analysis of the
41. The protocols were admitted under Rule 801(d)(2) as admissions of a party oppo-
nent. Id. at 1294-97.
42. The memoranda did not possess the necessary regularity and did not identify the
writer, therefore they did not qualify under Rule 803(6), as a business record. Id. at 1297-
1301.
43. The document of the EIAJ did not even identify who made the statements, thus
they could not be attributed to the assertions of the defendants. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2). Id.
at 1301-03.
The memorandum, termed the Japan Victor Document, amounted to an agreement "to
modify their (the manufacturers') accounting practices to cover up the disparity between
home markets and export practices."Id. at 1303. Zenith placed substantial importance and
reliance on this document. The company filed a forty-six page brief addressing the admissi-
bility of this document. It did not, however, meet any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule,
notably the business record exception, nor was it properly authenticated. FED R. EvID. 803
(6). Id. at 1303-10.
Another group, the TV Export Council, had also generated a substantial amount of
documents produced by Matsushita. At this point, the court, frustrated by repetitious anal-
ysis, summarily excluded these documents on similar grounds as the memoranda of the
EIAJ. Id. at 1310-13.
44. Zenith (III), 505 F. Supp. at 1313.
45. FED. R. EVID. 703.
46. Zenith (III), 505 F.Supp. at 1322.
47. Id. at 1324. The trial court struggled to find authority that would state a standard
to assess "reasonable reliance." The obvious points were that the source of information must
be "either intimately connected with his immediate sphere of expertise, . . .or upon un-
questionably permissible documentary research." Id. at 1326-27. The court, relying on Pitts-
burgh Press Club v. United States, 579 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1978), decided that when informa-
tion forming the foundation of the expert's opinion is excluded as untrustworthy and
unreliable, the court would balance the expert evidence in favor of exclusion. Id. at 1327-30.
48. The court took issue with the fact that the plaintiffs recruited economists to find a
conspiracy - a matter normally out of an economist's province. The conclusive findings of a
conspiracy through documents submitted as evidence would take over the function of the
fact finder. The experts had done no more than to read the evidentiary documents and
interpret them to show a conspiracy. Id. at 1342.
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evidence and the legal principles alleged to have been violated."9 Consid-
ering the fact that almost all of the evidence presented by Zenith had
been ruled inadmissible, the legal standards mandated by the statutes
could not be met. The court concluded that based upon the admissible
evidence, both direct and circumstantial, and viewing all reasonable infer-
ences in favor of the plaintiff, no probative evidence was presented to
make a permissible inference of the existence of a conspiracy.5" The
plaintiff had not raised a genuine issue of material fact of a conspiracy in
order to defeat the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56 summary
judgment motion.
B. The Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the trial court's
decision, holding that the judge had incorrectly assessed the admissibility
of the evidence.5 ' The standard for summary judgment applied by the
district court was upheld; therefore, the decision was based on the in-
creased number of evidentiary documents admitted. Considering much of
what was excluded by the district court, the court of appeals decided
that, in fact, a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a con-
spiracy was presented by the record.8"
Of the documents urged by Zenith for admission, the U.S. adminis-
trative cases, the findings of the JFTC, the expert opinion reports and
some of the diaries were found to be admissible.53 As to the antidumping
administrative cases, the court concluded that the expectation of the trial
court as to the complexity and thoroughness of administrative hearings
was too high and that the opportunity for a defendant to challenge the
findings were adequate." Consequently, the trial court had abused its dis-
cretion in excluding the antidumping findings. The JFTC cases were ad-
missible on the same grounds, even though the cases did not go beyond
investigatory reports.56
The appellate court held that the standard for admitting expert
opinions was also incorrect. What constitutes the type of data an expert
can "reasonably rely" upon to form an opinion was for the experts to
49. Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1100. The opinion spans over 300 pages and is integrated.
The evidentiary evaluations are numerous and cannot be consolidated into a few
statements.
50. "[A] jury is permitted to draw only those inferences of which the evidence is rea-
sonably susceptible: it may not resort to speculation." Id. at 1171 (quoting from British
Airways Board v. Boeing Co. 585 F.2d 946,-952 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied. 440 U.S. 981, 99
S.Ct. 1790, 60 L.Ed.2d 241 (1979)).
51. In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1983).
52. 723 F.2d at 316.
53. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
54. 723 F.2d at 268. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) was misconstrued to require
"an evidentiary hearing providing an opportunity for cross-examination."
55. Id. at 271-75.
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decide and not the trial court. 6 The uncontradicted affidavits by the ex-
perts, stating that "the data they relied on in forming their opinions were
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in their respective fields,"
should not have been ignored; rather they should have been dispositive of
the determination.
5 7
Some of the diaries were found to be admissible by the court of ap-
peals as records of regularly conducted business activity 51 since the stan-
dard used by the trial court was too stringent. 9 The record is trustworthy
so long as it is regularly kept, and an ambiguity as to the meaning cannot
be grounds for exclusion.6
The additional evidence made available would seem to make the task
of overcoming a summary judgment easier. The court of appeals, how-
ever, still had to make the inferences of antitrust violations in a con-
clusory manner. The appellate court found that the admissible evidence
would lead a fact-finder to infer an agreement among the Japanese manu-
facturers to stabilize home market prices, which in turn assured profits.
The expert opinions also reinforced the finding of a domestic price fixing
cartel." Adding the excess capacity and the U.S. compatible CEPs of the
Japanese manufacturers would lead the fact finder to the inference of a
strong incentive to enter and compete in the U.S. market." By combining
the two, the court concluded that "it would permit a fact-finder to infer a
motive to sell at prices low enough to eliminate competition in the United
States market by American firms."'" The leap from the possibility of an
unfair trade practice to predatory pricing was substantial. Nevertheless,
the inferences, made possible in the court's view by the direct and cir-
cumstantial evidence, were sufficient to overcome a summary judgment
motion.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals briefly considered the sovereign
compulsion defense urged by the defendants. The-court did not dismiss
the claim as an issue not considered at trial. Rather, the court pointed to
some of the factual issues surrounding the claim of the Japanese Govern-
ment. The facts indicated that the compulsion may not have been genu-
ine and that the governmental mandate may have been created under the
manufacturers' direction. Because of the factual dispute arising from the
Japanese Government's statement, a summary judgment without the fac-
tual resolution as to the true nature of the Japanese Government's state-
56. Id. at 277.
57. Id. at 276.
58. FED. R. EvID. Rule 803(6).
59. Id. at 289. In order to decide on reliability, the court should not analyze the proce-
dures or employees making the records, rather that "record keeping is essential to an ongo-
ing business activity." 723 F.2d at 268.
60. Id. at 290.
61. Id. at 309.
62. Id. at 310.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
VOL. 15:2,3
MATSUSHITA V. ZENITH
ment was improper. In essence, the court of appeals turned the defense
against the defendants to rule against a summary judgment.64 The fact
that the court did not give conclusive effect to the statement became the
greatest controversy in the case. This was evidenced by the numerous
amicus briefs filed with the Supreme Court."5
C. The Supreme Court
The district court decision relied heavily on the exclusion of a sub-
stantial portion of the evidence presented by the plaintiff. Consequently,
the remaining admissible evidence could not overcome the summary judg-
ment motion. The court of appeals changed the standard of admissibility,
and, based upon the admission of more evidence, found the presence of a
genuine issue of material fact. The Supreme Court did not even consider
the admissibility of evidence issue that subsumed the lower courts.6" In-
stead, the Court went straight to the standard for evaluating a summary
judgment motion. Therefore, the Court reversed even though additional
evidence had been deemed admissible on appeal.
In addition to the showing of a genuine issue for trial under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e), the plaintiff must show an injury caused
by the alleged illegal conduct.6" The Court concluded summarily that
since all of the alleged conspiracies except the predatory pricing would
benefit the plaintiffs, they need not be considered.68 In other words, the
other conspiracies could not be used to make inferences about the preda-
tory price fixing conspiracy.
The other prong of Rule 56(e) is to show a genuine issue of material
fact. Direct evidence of a conspiracy is not necessary (and quite unlikely)
and inferences can be made from the evidence. However, the Court con-
cluded that "antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from
ambiguous evidence in a [Sherman Act] section 1 case."" The inferences
of conspiratorial activity must also overcome possible inferences of legal
conduct. As the Court stated in First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities
64. Id. at 315.
65. See infra notes 78 to 83 and accompanying text.
66. Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1352. The Court had limited the grant of certiorari to
exclude the evidentiary rulings. 471 U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1863 (1985).
67. 106 S. Ct. at 1356. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(e) states that:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of his pleading, but in his response, by affidavits or otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against him.
FED R. Civ. P. 56(e).
68. Id. An example of "other" conspiracies is the "Five Company Rule," whereby the
Japanese manufacturers agreed not to deal with more than five companies in the United
States.
69. 106 S. Ct. at 1357.
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Services Co.,7" when equally plausible explanations are legal conduct,
then no inference of a conspiracy can be made. Thus with equally plausi-
ble motives, the motion for summary judgment must be granted'.7 The
ambiguity presented by deciding on "equally plausible motives" was re-
solved in a later case in favor of a defendant, whereby a plaintiff must
submit evidence "that tends to exclude" the possibility of independent
action.
72
The Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeals failed to
consider whether any plausible motive existed to engage in predatory
pricing, and instead focused on the "direct evidence of concert of ac-
tion."73 Most of the direct evidence relied upon focused on "other" con-
spiracies that had no relevance to the predatory pricing conspiracy. With-
out evidence relating to the predatory pricing and without a plausible
motive to engage in a conspiracy, the appellate court committed a revers-
ible error.
The dissent took issue with the majority's use of Monsanto to give
the trial judge power to dismiss a case when the inferences are implausi-
ble.74 The dissent would probably reverse the trend started in Cities Ser-
vices. The role of the judge would only be to decide if one of the possibili-
ties revealed by the evidence indicated the presence of a conspiracy; if so,
the factual determination must be made by the fact finder at trial.7"
The foreign sovereign compulsion defense presented by the Japanese
manufacturers rested mainly on the official statement submitted by the
Government of Japan to the trial court through the U.S. Department of
State in 1974. The statement described the role of the MITI, among other
instances, to monitor Japanese exports so that they did not disrupt the
national economies of Japan's trading partners. In the case of the CEP
manufacturers, the MITI "directed" the relevant industries and trade as-
sociations to enter into "arrangements" and thereafter "supervised" the
operation of the exporters.7 6 The defendant-petitioners argued that the
court of appeals had relied upon the "check prices" and the "five-com-
pany rule" to find inferences of a predatory conspiracy. The failure in the
appellate court's ruling was that these two features were part of the activ-
ities mandated by the MITI and should have been excluded from the
consideration of the court.7 7 The official representations of the Govern-
ment of Japan as to these features should have been given conclusive ef-
70. 391 U.S. 253, 280 (1968).
71. 106 S. Ct. at 1357.
72. Id. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (supplier and
several dealers conspired to exclude a single dealer).
73. 106 S. Ct. at 1361.
74. 106 S. Ct. at 1363 (White, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1366.
76. Brief for the Government of Japan at 8a-lla, Matsushita.
77. Petitioner's Brief at 38, Matsushita.
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fect.78 Since the contents of the statement indicated both compulsion and
supervision, the petitioners concluded that it also applied to fulfill the
elements of the foreign sovereign compulsion defense.79
The plaintiff-respondents did not rely on the compulsion of the Japa-
nese Government as enumerated in the arrangements to point out preda-
tory pricing. Rather the violation of the arrangements by the manufactur-
ers was crucial to show a conspiracy not protected by the defense."0
Zenith went further to argue that the sovereign compulsion defense
should not be available for "commercial" activities compelled by the gov-
ernment." The final argument made by Zenith related to the statement
by the Government of Japan. The respondents would place two require-
ments on governmental communications. First, to have them be specific
in order to assess the validity of the compulsion, and second, to have the
government statement be presented in a timely fashion. 2 Zenith con-
tended that the statement of the Japanese Government presented to the
court did not meet either requirement.
The foreign sovereign compulsion issue brought forth a deluge of
concern from various parties. Each amicus, except that of the Japanese
Government, had a specific issue to address that basically related to the
compulsion issue tangentially. The Japanese Government rightfully ob-
jected to the critical treatment by the appellate court of its statement
submitted to the trial court and the Department of State. In describing
its position, the Japanese Government stated that:
the formal representations of foreign governments are to be given con-
clusive effect, and when the exercise of a state's sovereignty involves
only control of the activity of its own nationals within its territory,
with respect to its own export trade, foreign governments and foreign
courts should not question or punish such activity.8
The United States Government agreed with this position. In a turn-
around from earlier opposition to the compulsion defense, the U.S. Gov-
ernment asked the Court to give the Japanese statement "dispositive
weight" and to hold that the court of appeals "erred in leaving open the
possibility that on remand, liability might be predicated on that agree-
78. Id. at 40-41. The petitioners based this argument on the act of state doctrine, where
inquiry by the courts into the validity of a foreign sovereign's acts is prohibited.
79. Id. at 42.
80. Respondent's Brief at 89, 91-92, Matsushita.
81. Id. at 92-93. The mistake made by the respondents in carving out a commercial
exception is similar to the petitioners. See supra note 74. By considering the compulsion
defense as a corollary to the act of state doctrine the analysis of its application becomes
incorrect. See infra notes 105 to 106 and accompanying text.
82. Id. at 94. The statement had to be specific because the court should not accept the
government's statement at face value. For instance, the government had to define "under
the direction" in order to allow the court to assess the compulsive nature of the word. Id. at
95-96. The requirement for a timely statement was to not disrupt the judicial process during
the late stages of adjudication.
83. Brief for the Government of Japan, at 5-6.
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ment."' The new position adopted by the United States was due to
changes in foreign policy. In recent years, the Reagan administration has
requested Japan to adopt voluntary controls on the export of automobiles
to the United States, with the assurance that antitrust liability would not
be imposed upon participating Japanese exporters. The Government had
to give effect to the defense in order to preserve its own integrity.8
The governments of Australia, Canada, France and the United King-
dom used this opportunity to air their grievances. They pointed out that
the U.S. Government had given assurances of immunity based upon the
compulsion defense in order to accede to requests for government man-
dated export restraints." Actually there was a related issue that
prompted the response by these countries. They were dissatisfied with
the procedure adopted in 1978 of filing their concerns directly with the
court instead of the executive branch. They felt that such filings were
ineffective, as depicted by the Seventh Circuit's treatment of the amicus
curiae briefs in the Uranium case.8 7 The court disregarded the contents
of the briefs and continued to rule on the appeal. This action "prompted
the Legal Advisor of the State Department to request the Justice Depart-
ment to inform the court that the court's language has caused serious
embarrassment to the United States in its relation with some of our clos-
est allies."88
IV. THE END OF PREDATORY PRICING?
The issue of predatory pricing has been debated extensively in the
past ten years. Though predatory behavior has been considered un-
likely, 9 the introduction of a new economic analysis in 19750 sparked the
interest of many commentators."1 Up to this point, the analyses offered
84. Brief for the United States at 17, Matsushita.
85. Id. at 18.
86. Brief for the Governments of Australia, Canada, France and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland at 4, Matsushita. [hereinafter cited as Allies Brief]
87. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
88. Allies Brief at 6.
89. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, I J. L. & ECON.
137 (1958).
90. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
91. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 144-60 (1978);
R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 184-96 (1976); Scherer, Predatory
pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L REV. 869 (1976); Williamson, Preda-
tory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977); Baumol, Quasi-
Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE
L.J. 1 (1979); Greer, A Critique of Areeda and Turner's Standard for Predatory Pricing, 24
ANTITRUST BULL. 233 (1979); Joskow & Klevorik, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory
Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979); Koller, When is Pricing Predatory?, 24 ANTITRUST
BULL. 283 (1979); McGee, supra note 85; Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counter-
strategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981); Ordover & Willig, An Economic Definition of




by the commentators had been ignored to a great extent by the courts.2
The courts had analyzed predatory pricing based upon the theories
formulated in the initial Sherman Act cases at the turn of the century
known as the "trust era. '9 3 This period in time was "characterized by the
uninhibited commercial warfare in the attempt of industrial giants to mo-
nopolize various fields of business activity in their battle for
supremacy."9 ' The paradigm case decided by the Supreme Court was
Standard Oil Company v United States.9 5 Standard Oil methodically ac-
quired control of the market by targeting one single wholesaler at a time.
One form of control was to obtain all information about its competitor's
customers and offer lower prices and rebates and even engage in decep-
tion to woo the dealer away from the competitor. 6 This action was cou-
pled with disciplinary actions against a recalcitrant dealer-customer."'
The theory of predation espoused by the Supreme Court was simple.
Predatory pricing was limited to considering whether a dominant firm
had sold their products at "below cost to eliminate rivals and subse-
quently earns monopoly profit."9 8 Its holding was based on a series of
presumptions raised by the behavior of the defendants. Under this the-
ory, the courts would find a predatory scheme if the evidence revealed:
(1) monopolistic power and large size advantage of the predator firm;
(2) for a firm serving several geographic or related product markets, a
pricing differential between a predator's 'monopoly' market and its
competitive market; (3) sales below average total cost in the competi-
tive market; (4) injury or exclusion of smaller competitors or new en-
trants as a result of such pricing ; and (5) intent of the predator firm
to exclude or discipline rivals.99
After 1975, with the advent of new economic models, the lower courts
have adopted various new legal standards that take into account eco-
nomic analyses.' 0 None of the legal standards has been reviewed by the
92. Calvani & Lynch, Predatory Pricing under the Robinson Patman and Sherman
Acts: An Introduction, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 378 (1981).
93. Cassady & Brown, Exclusionary Tactics in American Business Competition: An
Historical Analysis, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 88, 89 (1961).
94. Id.
95. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
96. State v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 444, 116 S.W. 902 (1909).
97. Cassady & Brown, supra note 93, at 105.
98. Brodly & Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolu-
tion of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738, 741 (1981).
99. Id. at 766. The relative importance of the criteria was dependent upon the claim.
See e.g. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966)(Sherman Act); Utah Pie Co. V.
Continental Baking Co. 386 U.S. 685 (1967)(Robinson-Patman Act).
100. See Brodly & Hay, supra note 98, at 767-772. The legal standards followed by the
courts fall into three categories:
1. The marginal cost standard. Pricing below marginal cost or average variable
cost is unlawful: pricing above marginal cost or average variable cost is lawful.
This is the Areeda-Turner Rule [See supra note 90].
2. Augmented marginal cost standards. Although pricing below marginal cost
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Supreme Court; therefore there presently exists a disharmony in the fed-
eral courts.0 1 In view of the Matsushita opinion, the standards may be-
come irrelevant in the future.
The Supreme Court has placed a barrier in cases alleging predatory
pricing. If the dicta stated by the Court is adopted by the lower courts,
then such cases may rarely go beyond the pretrial stage."0 2 The Court
cited commentators that stand for the nonexistence of predatory pric-
ing.1 0 3 Of the many rules invented in the past ten years, there is a group
that espouses a "no rule" perspective. "The 'no rule' proponents argue
that even given the illegality of merger and collusion today, predation will
very unlikely be a profit-maximizing strategy."'0 4 Based upon "a consen-
sus among commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried,
and even more rarely successful," the Court set up a presumption that a
single firm, not to mention several conspiring firms, will not engage in a
predatory pricing scheme.10 5
When confronted with a summary judgment motion, courts must
now decide the reasonableness of the alleged conspiracy in view of other
possible inferences. 0 6 When the claim seems to be unreasonable or "if the
claim is one that simply makes no economic sense - [plaintiffs] must
come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than
would be otherwise necessary."' 01 The Court considered whether the
claim of predatory pricing by the Japanese manufacturers was reasonable
by first looking at predatory pricing from a general viewpoint. Since the
Court considered predatory pricing to be an unreasonable act by corpora-
tions, the conduct of a twenty year conspiracy by several firms in the
remains unlawful, pricing above marginal cost may also be unlawful, under the
following conditions:
a. The high entry barriers exception: Pricing above marginal cost is un-
lawful when entry barriers are "extremely high and the price is below
the "short run profit maximizing price."
b. The marginal cost-plus-other-factors standard: Pricing above margi-
nal cost is unlawful when other probative factors demonstrate that the
price is predatory; these factors may include intent, limit pricing, non-
pricing predation, and entry barriers.
3. The average total cost standard. Pricing below average total cost or "full
cost" (average cost plus capital return) is unlawful when, in light of all the
facts, the price is unreasonable or predatory.
Id. at 769.
101. Id. at 768-769. As the Court stated: "There is a good deal of debate, both in the
cases and in the law reviews, about what 'cost' is relevant in such cases. We need not resolve
this debate here, because unlike the cases cited above, this is a Sherman Act Section 1
case." Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1355 n. 8.
102. 106 S.Ct. at 1357.
103. Id. at 1358.
104. Calvani & Lynch, supra note 92, at 389.
105. 106 S. Ct. at 1357-58.
106. Id. at 1357.
107. Id. at 1356.
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hope of finally reaping monopoly profits was quite unreasonable.0 8
The standard set by Matsushita, indicates that a trial court has two
roles in the case of a summary judgment motion. First the court will have
to rule on the evidence. The evidence must raise an inference of illegal
conduct that excludes possible explanations of legal conduct. Secondly,
and as a subsidiary to the first, the court must engage in an economic
analysis of the violation charged. If the antitrust violation, as theoreti-
cally presented, seems objectively unlikely in an economic or business
sense, the evidence required must "be more persuasive. . . than would be
otherwise necessary."'10 Based on the Court's analysis of predatory pric-
ing,11 a trial court can presume the theoretical presence of predatory
pricing through a multi-corporate conspiracy to be highly unlikely, there-
fore, as to any such allegations in the future, the standard of proof placed
upon plaintiffs shall be higher.
V. A STANDARD FOR THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
COMPULSION DEFENSE
A. Re-defining the Defense
The sovereign compulsion defense applies when a foreign nation
mandates a private entity or a group of entities to engage in activities
that violate U.S. antitrust laws. Antitrust liability will not be imposed on
corporate activity compelled by a foreign sovereign. The essential inquiry
in all cases relates to the existence of a true "compulsion." The courts
have considered the defense of sovereign compulsion as a corollary to the
act of state doctrine."' This evaluation of the defense is erroneous. The
two defenses do overlap in certain ways, but the application of each is
quite distinct.
The act of state doctrine based on the separation of powers principle,
is a judicial formula reflecting deference to the executive branch,
which the courts presume to be better qualified to handle the diplo-
matic and political consequences of an act of state. Sovereign compul-
sion, on the other hand, is a substantive defense to an antitrust com-
plaint; it is based on the theory that defendants are engaged in illegal
activity only because a foreign sovereign compelled them to do so. De-
spite these differences, the measures taken by foreign sovereigns to
compel firms to engage in illegal business restraints remain in essence
acts of state."'
Four rationales for the sovereign compulsion defense have been de-
108. Id. at 1360-62.
109. Id. at 1356.
110. That analysis includes the adoption of Judge Bork's view on predatory pricing.
See R. BORK, supra note 91, at 145.
111. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1976).
112. Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts
and Economic Coercion, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1976).
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veloped and they remain independent of the extension given to the act of
state. First, it would be unfair to hold a defendant liable for acts com-
pelled by a government authority." 3 Second, the foreign compulsion must
be recognized in order to foster commerce. Non-recognition could work
against an American company trying to do business within the laws of a
foreign sovereign." ' The third policy consideration parallels the act of
state doctrine in that a tribunal cannot engage in the valuation of foreign
laws and must exercise judicial restraint in such situations. ' 5 Finally, the
defense has been analogized to the state action doctrine formulated in
Parker v. Brown and its progeny."" The state action doctrine insulates
private parties from antitrust liability when their anticompetitive conduct
is a consequence of complying with domestic state regulation. The state
action doctrine provides the strongest analogy to sovereign compulsion."
7
The defense has only been established once in an independent form
by the courts. The court in Interamerican concluded that "sovereignty
includes the right to regulate commerce within the nation. When a nation
compels a trade practice, firms have no choice but to obey. Acts of busi-
ness become effectively acts of the sovereign. '"" s The rationale for inter-
preting the Sherman Act to exclude compelled actions was that commerce
is regulated by a sovereign and a refusal to comply with the regulation
eliminates commerce against the purpose of the Act which is to encourage
commerce." 9 The governmental mandate in Interamerican did compel
the defendants to act in an anti-competitive manner even though the gov-
ernment may have acted improperly.' The court did not provide any
guideline to finding genuine compulsion, but it did provide two instances
of unfounded compulsion: (1) when the defendants procure the govern-
mental action, and (2) when under an unspecified delegation of authority,
the defendant voluntarily acts in an uncompetitive manner.2
The Justice department rejected the holding in Interamerican.2
Through a hypothetical discussion of the same case, the Justice Depart-
113. 1 B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET, AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 614
(1986).
114. This is the rationale adopted in the only case upholding the defense, Interameri-
can Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
115. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 606.
116. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
117. Note, Redefining the Foreign Compulsion Defense in U.S. Antitrust Law: The
Japanese Auto Restraints and Beyond, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 747, 793 (1982).
118. Interamerican, 307 F. Supp. at 1298.
119. Id. The proposition was first set out by then Professor Brewster. K. BREWSTER,
ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 94 (1958).
120. Interamerican, 307 F. Supp. at 1298-99. The court used the act of state to bar
inquiry into the validity of the government order. In this manner, the court used the two
doctrines in their proper form.
121. Id. at 1297.
122. ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE ANTI-




ment declared the use of the act of state doctrine and the sovereign com-
pulsion defense to be improper because the directed conduct is to be ef-
fectuated in U.S. territory. 2 ' The hypothetical case was analyzed under
the legal principle of conflict of laws and the equitable application of
comity. By balancing the stakes to each country, the Department con-
cluded that the threat to U.S. interests would be greater; therefore, the
court must not exercise comity to dismiss the case. 24
The defense is on the books. Unfortunately, however, the policy or
rationale that is to guide the courts in their decision making is nonexis-
tent. The Matsushita case was ideal to discern the parameters of the sov-
ereign compulsion defense. The most important factor presented by the
case was the ability to decide on the weight to be given to an official
governmental statement citing governmental compulsion as the cause of a
defendant's actions. A Supreme Court decision could have followed either
of two paths. One would be to give the governmental statement conclu-
sive effect thereby invoking the defense without discussion. The other
path would be to pierce the statement and to analyze the facts surround-
ing the allegations of anticompetitive conduct along with the relationship
between the government and defendant business. 25 A conclusive state-
ment would preclude a search into the factual setting of the case, but this
is too harsh a result. If the sovereign compulsion defense is to become
absolute in such situations, American based businesses could be subjected
to repeated anti-competitive actions from countries that blend govern-
mental policy and business expansion. 2 ' A solution to the potential ineq-
uities of such a defense is a set of criteria that looks beyond the final form
of the compulsion presented at trial to the raison d'etre of the rule or
123. Id. at E-15.
124. Id. The Department relied on the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law
to determine the factors under the principles of comity.
125. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit revealed some of the ambiguous ele-
ments of the Japanese manufacturers defense in Matsushita:
It is possible to conclude that the government merely provided an umbrella
under which the defendants gained an exemption from Japanese antitrust law,
and fixed their own export prices. Second, there is abundant evidence sug-
gesting that many defendants parted from the agreed-upon minimums and
took steps to conceal their departure from MITI. Thirdly, there is no record
evidence suggesting that the five-company rule originated with the Japanese
Government. Finally, the evidence about price stabilization in the Japanese
home market suggests unequivocally that this activity violated the laws of
Japan.
In re Japanese, 723 F.2d at 315.
126. An example of close government-business relations is the Swiss government partic-
ipation in the Swiss watch manufacturers cartel's effort to curb the international watch-
making industry. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.,
[19631 Trade Cas. (CCH) 77, 414, 77628-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) modified [1965] Trade Cas. 80,
490 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (the case was dismissed through a consent decree). The Japanese gov-
ernment (MITI) participation in the cartelization of industries is pervasive, with the Japa-
nese CEP exporters being one example of many. R. CAVES & M. VEKUSA, INDUSTRIAL ORGAN-
IZATION IN JAPAN 6 (1976).
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laws and to analyze the degree of governmental participation, direct or
indirect, in forcing compliance by the business enterprise.
B. A Proposed Test to Analyze the Defense
Changes in the trade laws'27 and the ambiguity caused by the court
of appeal's treatment of the defense made a decision by the Supreme
Court necessary and timely. A standard is necessary to guide future liti-
gation. For instance, the semiconductor industry took an interest in the
Matsushita case fearing an opinion allowing the defense to be absolute in
light of the statement by the Government of Japan. The commentators,
possibly due to a lack of judicial guidance, are at odds on what the basis
for the defense should be.
Hawk proposes a standard based upon fairness to the defendants.'28
The focus of his test is the actual compulsion on the defendants. The
compulsion does not have to be through a particular form.'2 9 Upon a find-
ing of true compulsion, the inquiry should shift to the location of the
effect. Hawk opposes the absolute territorial limitation favored by the
Justice Department. 3 0 He considers that certain circumstances do exist
when the effect in the United States would still allow the sovereign com-
pulsion defense, however, he does not provide much guidance as to its
application."'
Another formula applies the domestic state action doctrine to the
sovereign compulsion defense.'32 The test enunciated in California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 33 has two prongs: (1) an
affirmative articulation of state policy; and (2) active supervision of the
challenged restraint by the state. If both parts are met, the private entity
under the direction of the state would be exempt from antitrust liability.
Waller proposes to modify the first prong by changing the requirement of
legislation as a statement of policy to accepting those forms of decision-
making appropriate to a foreign sovereign. The second prong would be
modified to "active enforcement" instead of supervision. 3 This test
abandons the search for compulsion by "objectively address[ing] the
level, rather than the form, of government involvement.I' 3 Like Hawk,
Waller would not apply an absolute territorial limitation to the defense.
127. Trade Act of 1974 § 203, 19 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1982) (voluntary restraint agree-
ments negotiated at the intergovernmental level).
128. 1 B. HAWK, supra note 113, at 614.
129. Id. at 626.
130. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
131. 1 B. HAWK, supra note 113, at 630.
132. Note, supra note 117, at 747.
133. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). Though other cases on the doctrine were decided subsequent to
Midcal, the basic test remains the same. Kellman & Hiser, The Antitrust State Action
Exemption: An Essay on Doctrinal Organization from Parker to Hallie and Southern Mo-
tor Carriers, 29 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 83 (1985).
134. Note, supra note 117, at 801.
135. Id. at 799.
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The Department of Justice refuted a comparison of the compulsion
defense to the state action doctrine in Matsushita.-' First, the power of
the courts to initially determine the validity of the state's program does
not comport with the compulsion defense's need to avoid the comparison
of national interests. Second, there are practical difficulties in assessing
what comprises "state action" in a foreign legal system, including the dif-
ficulty in inquiring into the foreign state's conduct to find the presence of
supervision.' 37 The domestic courts just do not have the flexibility to
make the same determinations when a foreign government, as opposed to
a state, is involved.
All of the commentators, however, do agree with some basic factors.
If a private party actively solicits the compulsion from the government,
the sovereign compulsion defense will not apply.138 If a government only
encourages private parties to follow a general national policy, compulsion
will never be found.'
39
The facts in Matsushita reveal some of the peculiar hardships that
would confront a court deciding the validity of a foreign sovereign com-
pulsion. There is some efficacy to using a simple test to analyze the prob-
lem, such as the two prong test of Midcal; however, the unique circum-
stances of each case warrants the adoption of a multi-factor test that
would account for the multitude of possible variations. The proposed test
seeks to balance three interests: the need to defer to foreign sovereigns;
the fairness to the businesses under compulsion; and the need of U.S.-
based businesses to compete freely.
A court confronted with the compulsion defense must begin with two
premises before analyzing the facts. First, the court must not analyze the
legitimacy of the government order or legislation. The court must accept
it at face value for what it says. There must not be an inquiry as to au-
thority, i.e. an ultra vires act, because the result will not change the re-
quirement of compliance by a business. Second, the court must not con-
sider the form of the government order. The fact that a defendant
conducts his business in an anticompetitive manner, because of an oral
agency order does not automatically change the strength of the compul-
sion. This fact is especially true in view of the variant legal systems and
their true application by the officials. By disregarding these two matters,
the court can focus on the conduct of all of the relevant parties from the
time before the government mandate through the time the antitrust claim
arises. The factors are enumerated below.
136. Brief for the United States at 20, Matsushita.
137. Id. at 21.
138. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
139. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, [1963] Trade
Cas. (CCH) 77, 414 (S.D.N.Y.).
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1. Who Initiated the Compulsion?
The focus here is on the government and the defendants. As stated
before, the substantial efforts of the defendants in obtaining government
action would negate the compulsion defense. The efforts must be beyond
lobbying actions and would certainly include drafted proposals to be
adopted by the government or its instrumentality.
In the Matsushita case, the issue rests with the allegation by Zenith
that the Japanese manufacturers petitioned the government for permis-
sion to form the cartel.140 If this is a prescribed form of addressing the
government, then the effort is not as substantial as when the petition is a
unique circumstance. An additional concern is the presence of a third
party inducing the government to act. For instance, if the United States
plays a part in negotiating trade restraints with another government, the
pressure of such an initiating party would merit a finding in favor of the
defense.
2. Who Sets the Standards of the Compulsion?
The focus here is on the contents and particularity of the govern-
ment mandate. If the government legislates that no shoes will be exported
to the United States for six months, the standard is clear and compulsion
is present. However, if the government requires all manufacturers to
come to an agreement to set the conditions for exporting and to make
periodic revisions as they see fit, then the manufacturers anti-competitive
behavior would be suspect.
The court of appeals considered this factor in Matsushita."' A sum-
mary judgment was held to be improper, in part, because the pre-trial
evidence indicated that the Japanese Government did not participate in
setting the standards for exporting CEP's to the United States. The Japa-
nese manufacturers repeatedly pointed to their government's statement
sent to the U.S. Department of State. 2 While conceding that the manu-
facturers conducted the negotiations, the defendants emphasized that
"MITI supervised the preparation of such agreements and regulation so
that the MITI's intention was correctly reflected."'1
4 3
3. Is the Government's Role Administrative or Supervisory?
The role of the government after the passage of a mandate or regula-
tion can help define the character of the compulsion. Like the state action
doctrine, the participation of the government can be crucial to finding
compulsion.' 4 ' No matter what policy the government may have set to
140. Respondent's Brief at 14, Matsushita.
141. In re Japanese, 723 F.2d at 315.
142. Petitioner's Brief at 35, Matsushita.
143. Id. at 37.
144. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., though a state's regulation required a public util-
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justify the defendants' actions, unless their role is to effectuate compli-
ance with that policy, the compulsion may be illusory. An example of the
difference could be a periodic reporting requirement, as opposed to pre-
liminary approval of changes or modifications which the defendants de-
sire. In order to help define the role of the government, a court should
consider the sanctions for non-compliance. The presence of sanctions im-
plies a supervisory role because the intention of the government to par-
ticipate is manifested by the power to keep a party within the boundaries
of a regulation. The degree of supervision, however, will depend upon the
legal system under which the defendants function.
The 1975 Japanese Government Statement indicated that "[h]ad the
Japanese television manufacturers and exporters failed to comply with
MITI's direction to establish such an agreement or regulation, MITI
would have invoked its power [under Japanese law] to unilaterally control
television sales for export to the United States and carry out its estab-
lished trade policy."" 5 The court of appeals indicated that "[ilt is possi-
ble to conclude that the [Japanese] government merely provided an um-
brella under which the defendants gained an exemption from Japanese
antitrust law, and fixed their own prices."" 6 Since the allegations of a
conspiracy spans several decades, the role of the government in Matsu-
shita was important in deciding on the continued compliance with a gov-
ernment compulsion.
4. Is the Involvement of the Defendants Voluntary or Mandatory?
When participation is mandatory, the defendant's involvement ap-
proaches a duress or necessity argument that would excuse their non-
competitive behavior.1 4 7 It is important to see who falls within the pur-
view of the decree at the outset. If only half of the targeted industries
respond to the decree with no sanctions on the non-reacting half, then the
compulsive nature of the decree is diminished. If the decree or any other
final agreement specifies the right to exit from the grouping, then compli-
ance becomes voluntary and there is no actual compulsion.In Matsushita,
Zenith presented the "Rationales" agreement signed by the Japanese
manufacturers, which had a non-restrictive clause to allow any signatory
to leave the cartel.' 48 This clause indicates that the MITI did not have
the power to force the participation by all of the manufacturers in the
cartel, thus diminishing the efficacy of "true" compulsion.
ity to maintain a program that violated the Sherman Act, the public utility was liable be-
cause the program could be easily removed by filing for a tariff change. 428 U.S. 579, 593-94
(1976) Thus, state action without subsequent supervision would remove immunity from an-
titrust liability under the state action doctrine. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n V.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445. U.S. 97 (1980). See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
145. Petitioner's Brief at 37.
146. In re Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d at 315.
147. Note, Foreign Sovereign Compulsion in American Antitrust Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 131, 144-45 (1980).
148. Respondents Brief at 14, Matsushita.
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5. At What Time was The State Policy Specified or Clarified?
This factor cannot have a substantial effect upon the decision of a
court, but it does help to analyze the compulsive nature, especially if the
government decree was known and practiced by the parties before the
presence of an impending litigation.
The emergence of this factor is due to the Matsushita case. The Jap-
anese manufacturers wanted the Court to define the nature of the foreign
sovereign compulsion through the contents of the 1975 Japanese Govern-
ment Statement."'9 The amicus brief of the U.S. Solicitor General agreed
with this point and urged the Court to give that statement conclusive
effect. 150 Such a proposition would neutralize a court's fact-finding role.
This factor must be viewed in conjunction with the first three. Since
the factual determinations made under the first three factors can contra-
dict a statement presented by a government during litigation, a con-
clusory effect on that statement would be improper. This is not to say
that a government is lying about the nature of its laws, but that under an
objective assessment of the facts the defendants would not have deemed
themselves to be under compulsion at the time they acted; thus, they are
not entitled to the defense as a matter of fairness. A policy statement
contemporaneous with the government mandate is probative of the fact
that the defendants were made aware of the compulsion. The statement
presented by the Japanese Government in the Matsushita case stated the
law and also presented facts that would weigh the first three factors in
their favor. On the basis of that letter alone, this test would satisfy the
sovereign compulsion defense. However, the facts alleged by Zenith show
otherwise. The resolution of the facts is not proper here, but a court
should look beyond a later governmental statement for earlier policy
statements that would support the defense. The only significant ramifica-
tion presented by such a rule would be that countries, who want to legis-
late or administer rules upon private parties in their trade with the
United States, would be on notice to clearly state why and how they want
to affect U.S. trade.
6. What is the Nature of the Trade Position Before and After the
Defendant's Anti-competitive Behavior?
A major concern in this factor is the territorial effect of the foreign
sovereign's actions. The position of the Department of Justice under the
International Antitrust Guide' 5 ' does not carry over to the Matsushita
case. The Department made no reference to the territorial effect of the
defendants's action nor to the MITI mandate, and instead emphasized
the harmful consequences to trade relations if a trial court were to rule on
149. Petitioner's Brief at 35, Matsushita.
150. Brief for the United States, Matsushita.
151. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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the nature of the compulsion.'5 2 The effect on the U.S. trade position
should be used as an auxiliary factor to support or contradict the policy
stated by the foreign sovereign. If the policy is to limit adverse effects
upon U.S. manufacturers and, in actuality, the U.S. production has fallen
to nominal amounts, it would be probative of actions contradictory to the
policy. A contradiction between what is said and what is done increases
the importance of the factual findings under the first three factors. If the
two elements support each other then a conclusive effect upon the gov-
ernmental statement of compulsion would be proper.
The six factor test is designed to define a new role for a court con-
fronted with the constraints of actions by foreign sovereigns. That role is
to allow a U.S. court to look beyond government edicts when private par-
ties are involved. The court must be able to look to the facts surrounding
a case. The six factor test does not seek to eliminate the defense; rather it
seeks to differentiate "true" compulsion in implementing trade policies
from a sovereign's protection of domestic companies. The Matsushita
case does not clearly show either finding based upon the facts considered
by the district court, and on that basis would have made an ideal case to
devise a standard for the foreign sovereign compulsion defense.
VI. CONCLUSION
The impact of Matsushita upon the field of antitrust law and specifi-
cally on cases alleging predatory pricing is yet to be seen. The adoption of
a firm policy towards predation indicates the necessity of approaching
any future litigation with a very strong case. The ability to succeed with
only predatory pricing conspiracy will be rare; thus, a plaintiff will have
to present the court with some form of direct evidence in order to
succeed.
The issue of the foreign sovereign compulsion defense remains unan-
swered. The controversy surrounding this issue has not been preeminent,
and this may account for the avoidance of the issue by the Supreme
Court. However, there exists the possibility of a greater number of com-
plaints leading to the assertion of this defense. The trend in the trade
laws to resolve trade problems through inter-governmental negotiations
will necessarily involve foreign governmental participation. If such cases
do arise in conjunction with governmental statements indicating compul-
sion, the statements should not be given dispositive effect. The con-
clusory effect of such statements should only follow support in the facts
corroborating them. Such a policy will not negate the defense, but rather,
will only place the countries on notice to relate their trade policies toward
the United States in a prescribed manner.
152. Brief for the United States at 18-19, Matsushita.
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